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Acronyms
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• Analog to Digital Converter (ADC)
• Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
• Agile Mixed Signal (AMS)
• ARM Holdings Public Limited Company (ARM)
• Bayesian Networks (BN)
• Controller Area Network (CAN)
• Controller Area Network Flexible Data-Rate (CAN-FD)
• Cache Coherent Interconnect (CCI)
• a device or program that compresses data to enable 
faster transmission and decompresses received data 
(Codec)
• chemistry of failure (COF)
• Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS)
• Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC)
• Communications Security Establishment (CSE)
• Camera Serial Interface 2nd Generation (CSI2)
• Control Unit (CU)
• Display Control Unit (DCU)
• Double Data Rate (DDR3 = Generation 3; DDR4 =  
Generation 4)
• identify and remove errors from computer hardware or 
software (DEBUG)
• Direct Memory Access (DMA)
• Digital Signal Processing (DSP)
• Dynamic Signal Processing Instrument (dSPI)
• Dual Channel (Dual Ch.)
• Error-Correcting Code (ECC)
• error detection and correction (EDAC)
• Electrical, Electronic, and Electromechanical (EEE)
• Equipment Monitor And Control (EMAC)
• Epitaxy, the deposition of a crystalline overlayer on a 
crystalline substrate (epi)
• electrostatic discharge (ESD)
• Event Timers (eTimers)
• Fluidized Catalytic Cracking Unit (FCCU)
• FlexRay Communication Controller (FlexRay)
• Gigabyte (Gb)
• Global Industry Classification (GIC)
• Government (Gov't)
• Graphics Processing Unit (GPU)
• Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
• Goal Structuring Notation (GSN)
• Transceiver Type (GTH/GTY)
• High Density Digital Input/Output (HDIO)
• High-Dynamic-Range (HDR)
• High Performance Input/Output (HPIO)
• input/output (I/O)
• Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C)
• Joint Photographic Experts Group (JPEG)
• independent caches organized as a hierarchy 
(L2 Cache)
• low earth orbit (LEO)
• Local Interconnect Network Flexible (LinFlex)
• Long-Memory (L-mem)
• Low Power (LP)
• Memory/Logic Built-In Self-Test (M/L BIST)
• model based mission assurance (MBMA)
• Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
• Mobile Industry Processor Interface (MIPI)
• Microprocessor Unit (MPU)
• Negated AND or NOT AND (NAND)
• National Aeronautics and Space Administration  
(NASA )
• NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging  (NEPP )
• Not OR logic gate (NOR)
• on-chip RAM (OCM)
• Peripheral Component Interconnect Express 
(PCIe)
• Peripheral Component Interconnect Express 
Generation 2 (PCIe Gen2)
• Physics of Failure  (POF )
• PS-GTR is a type of transceiver (PS-GTR)
• Research and Development (R&D)
• Radiation Hardened (Rad Hard)
• Random Access Memory (RAM)
• Red, Green, and Blue (RGB)
• Successive-Approximation-Register 
(SAR)
• Serial Advanced Technology 
Attachment (SATA)
• Secondary Control Unit (SCU)
• Secure Digital embedded 
MultiMediaCard (SD/eMMC)
• Secure Digital High Capacity (SD-HC)
• Single Event Effect (SEE)
• System Memory Management Unit 
(SMMU)
• Systems on a Chip  (SOC )
• Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI)
• Size, weight, and power (SwaP)
• System Modeling Language (SysML)
• tightly-coupled memory (TCM)
• Total Ionizing Dose (TID)
• triple-modular redundancy (TMR)
• Temperature-Sensor (T-Sensor)
• Universal Asynchronous 
Receiver/Transmitter (UART)
• Universal Serial Bus (USB)
• watchdog timer (WDT)
• Freescale Zipwire interface (Zipwire)
• communication (comm)
• Fabrication Plant (fab)
• Supply Chain Brain (SCB), supply 
chain management information 
resource
• Ground (GND)
• linear energy transfer (LET)
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Abstract
• As the space business rapidly evolves to accommodate a 
lower cost model of development and operation via 
concepts such as commercial space and small spacecraft 
(aka, CubeSats and swarms), traditional EEE parts 
screening and qualification methods are being scrutinized 
under a risk-reward trade space. In this presentation, two 
basic concepts will be discussed:
– The movement from complete risk aversion EEE parts 
methods to managing and/or accepting risk via alternate 
approaches; and,
– A discussion of emerging assurance methods to reduce 
overdesign such as emerging model based mission assurance 
(MBMA) and Small Mission concepts.
• Example scenarios will be described as well as 
consideration for trading traditional versus alternate 
methods.
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Outline
• The Changing Space Market
– Commercial Space and “Small” Space
• EEE Parts Assurance
• Modern Electronics
– Magpie Syndrome
• Breaking Tradition: Alternate Approaches
– Higher Assembly Level Tests
– Use of Fault Tolerance
• Mission Risk and EEE Parts
• Summary
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Hubble Space Telescope courtesy NASA
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Space Missions:
How Our Frontiers Have Changed
• Cost constraints and cost “effectiveness” have led to 
dramatic shifts away from traditional large-scale 
missions (ex., Hubble Space Telescope).
• Two prime trends have surfaced:
– Commercial space ventures where the procuring agent 
“buys” a service or data product and the implementer is 
responsible for ensuring mission success with limited agent 
oversight. And,
– Small Missions such as CubeSats that are allowed to take 
higher risks based on mission purpose and cost.
• These trends are driving the usage of non traditional 
electronic part types such as those used in 
automotive systems as well as “architectural 
reliability” (aka, resilience) approaches for mission 
success.
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CubeSat by Mission Type
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After Swartwout, 2017 NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Electronics Technology Workshop (ETW), NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, June 26-29, 2017.
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Taxonomy #1: The mindset of the developer
7
• Hobbyist
– No real experience in the field
– Building for fun & future profit
– Ad hoc practices
• Industrialist
– Experienced builders of big 
spacecraft
– Building under gov’t contract
– Standard space system 
practices, with some truncation
• Crafter
– Experienced builders of small 
spacecraft
– Working under contract 
– Streamlined practices, 
experientially developed
• (Smallsat) Constellations
– Providing a geographically-distributed 
service (imaging, comm)
– Mission can be met with an ad hoc 
(?!?) implementation of orbits
– Spacecraft/launch costs are effectively 
free (I did say “effectively”)
After Swartwout, 2018 NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Electronics Technology Workshop (ETW), NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, June 18-21, 2018.
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Who is Responsible for This?
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Constellations
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CubeSat Mission Status, 2000-2017 (No constellations)
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All Missions (403) All missions reaching orbit (364)
Industrialists (39) Crafters (157) Hobbyists (168)
After Swartwout, 2018 NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Electronics Technology Workshop (ETW), NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, June 18-21, 2018.
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EEE Parts Assurance
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Assurance for EEE Parts
• Assurance is knowledge of
• The supply chain and manufacturer of the product 
• The manufacturing process and its controls
• The physics of failure (POF) and chemistry of failure 
(COF) related to the technology.
• Statistical process and inspection via
– Testing, inspection, physical analyses and modeling.
» Audits, process data analysis, electrostatic 
discharge (ESD), …
• Test/Qualification/Screening methods
– Understanding the application and 
environmental conditions for device usage.
• This includes factors such as:
– Radiation, Lifetime, Temperature, Vacuum, etc., and,
– Device application and appropriate derating criteria.
11
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Taking a Step Back…
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Physics of 
failure (POF)
Chemistry of 
failure (COF)
Screening/
Qualification
Methods
Mission
Reliability/
Success
Application/
Environment
It’s not just the technology,
but how to view the need for safe insertion into space programs.
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Reliability and Availability
• Definitions
– Reliability (Wikipedia)
• The ability of a system or component to perform its required 
functions under stated conditions for a specified period of time.
– Will it work for as long as you need?
– Availability (Wikipedia)
• The degree to which a system, subsystem, or equipment is in a 
specified operable and committable state at the start of a 
mission, when the mission is called for at an unknown, i.e., a 
random, time. Simply put, availability is the proportion of time a 
system is in a functioning condition. This is often described as a 
mission capable rate.
– Will it be available when you need it to work?
• Combining the two drives mission requirements:
– Will it work for as long as and when you need it to?
13
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What does this mean for EEE parts?
• Understanding of a device’s 
failure modes and causes 
drives
– Higher confidence level that it will 
perform under the mission 
environments and lifetime
– High confidence = “it has to work”
• High confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
– Less confidence = “it may work”
• Less confidence in both reliability 
and availability.
• It may still work, but prior to flight 
there is less certainty that it will.
14
CONFIDENCE
LEVEL
– INDESTRUCTIBLE
– STURDY
– STABLE
– INCREASING
– FINE
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Traditional EEE Parts
Approach to Confidence
• Part level screening
– Electronic component screening uses environmental 
stressing and electrical testing to identify marginal and 
defective components within a procured lot of EEE parts.
• Part level qualification
– Qualification processes are designed to statistically 
understand/remove known reliability risks and uncover 
other unknown risks inherent in a part.
15
• Requires significant 
sample size and a 
comprehensive suite of 
piecepart testing (insight) 
= High Confidence
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However, tradition doesn’t match the 
changing space market
(time to market, risk profiles, etc...).
Alternate EEE parts approaches that 
may be “good enough” are being used.
(Discussed later in presentation.)
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Modern Electronics
A History Lesson
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Military and Aerospace share is estimated at ~$3.1B in 2015.
Aerospace is a small percentage of this amount.
For comparison, in 1975
the Military and Aerospace market share was ~$50%!
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EEE parts are available in “grades”
• Grades – Designed, certified, qualified, and/or 
tested for specific environmental characteristics.
– E.g., Operating temperature range, vacuum, radiation, 
exposure,…
• Example grades:
– Aerospace, Military, Space Enhanced Product, 
Enhanced Product, Automotive, Medical, Extended-
Temperature-Commercial, and Commercial (often called 
commercial off the shelf  - COTS).
– Aerospace Grade is the traditional choice for space usage, but 
has relatively few available parts and their performance lags 
behind commercial counterparts (speed, weight, and power -
SWaP).
• Designed and tested for radiation and reliability for space usage.
• NASA uses a wide range of EEE part grades 
depending on multiple factors including 
technical, programmatic, and risk.
19
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The Magpie Syndrome:
The Electrical Designer’s Dilemma
• Magpie’s are known for being attracted to bright, 
shiny things.
• In many ways, the modern electrical engineer is a 
Magpie:
– They are attracted to the latest commercial state-of-the-
art devices and EEE parts technologies.
• Usually any grade of EEE parts that aren’t qualified for 
space nor radiation hardened.
– These bright and shiny parts may have very attractive 
performance features that aren’t available in higher-
reliability parts:
• Size, weight, and power (SwaP),
• Integrated functionality,
• Speed of data collection/transfer,
• Processing capability, etc…
20
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Example Magpie EEE Parts
21
Xilinx Zynq UltraScale+
Multi-Processor System on a Chip (MPSoC) -
16nm CMOS with Vertical FinFETS
Xilinx.com
Advanced Driver Assistance System (ADAS)
Sensor Fusion Processor
Freescale.com
To be presented by Kenneth A. LaBel at the SERESSA 2018 14th International School on the Effects of Radiation on Embedded Systems for Space 
Applications, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, November 12-16, 2018.
Gartner Hype Cycle –
Reality of Shiny New Things
22
gartner.com
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Magpie Constraints
• But Magpies aren’t designed for space flight
– Just some aviary (bird) aviation at best!
• Sample differences include:
– Temperature ranges,
– Vacuum performance,
– Shock and vibration,
– Lifetime, and
– Radiation tolerance.
• Traditionally, “upscreening” at the part level has 
occurred.
– Definition: A means of assessing a portion of the 
inherent reliability of a device via test and analysis.
• It does not increase reliability!
– Note: Discovery of a part not passing upscreening is a 
regular occurrence.
23
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Example Considerations for
When a Magpie Flies
• Aerospace (or at least Military grade) alternatives are not 
available,
– Ex., SWaP or specific function or procurement schedule,
• Mission has a relatively short lifetime or benign space 
environment exposure,
– Ex., 3 month CubeSat mission in LEO,
• System can assume risks (even unknown ones!),
– Ex., a technology demonstration mission,
• Sufficient device upscreening (per mission requirements) 
and system validation are performed to obtain high enough 
confidence level for risk posture,
• Sufficient system level assurances based on fault 
tolerance/resilience, higher assembly level test, and 
validation.
– Note: This is a systems engineering trade that takes a multi-
disciplinary review.
• Out of scope for this talk: use of flight data for “qualification”.
24
Product Grades “Decoder Ring”
R. Baumann, “From COTS to Space - Grade
Electronics: Improving Reliability for Harsh
Environments,” 2016 Single Event Effects (SEE)
Symp. and the Military and Aerospace
Programmable Logic Devices (MAPLD) Workshop,
May 23-26, 2016.
Quality / Reliability
The move to the middle!
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After Baumann, Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16-21, 2018.
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Multi-Fab Variability Example
- Why Single Controlled Baseline is Important
• Fab-to-Fab
– Usually worse than Lot-to-Lot
– Fab equipment set / version
– Fab layout / cycle time
– Fab recipe / starting material
– Fab metrology coverage
– Fab controls / methods
– Revisions / shrinks
– Design sensitivity / component choice
• Lot-to-Lot
– Usually worse than wafer-to-wafer
– Process has a natural variation
– Processes / Equipment drifts over time
– Process tweaks to boost yield
Single lot (wafer-to-wafer) 
variation single fab
Multi-lot variation for 
only two fabs
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After Baumann, Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16-21, 2018.
Variation and the “Matryoshka Paradigm”
COTS Flow
SCB Lot
Flow
Die-to-die
Wafer-to-wafer
A/T site-to-
A/T site
Fab-to-Fab
Lot-to-Lot
After Baumann, Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16-21, 2018.
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Mitigation of Single Event Latchup by Process
Example Variation Impact on Radiation Tolerance
Substitute standard p substrate with highly-
doped substrate w thin baseline EPI
p+
p++ substrate
n-well
p+n+n+
STI
Nwell contact
VDD
p+ anode
VDD
n+ cathode
GND
baseline p-EPI
Psub contact
GND
Epi depth
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After Baumann, Radiation Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS) conference, Gothenburg, Sweden, September 16-21, 2018.
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Mission Risk and EEE Parts
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Understanding Risk
• The risk management requirements 
may be broken into three 
considerations
– Technical/Design – “The Good”
• Relate to the circuit designs not being able to 
meet mission criteria such as jitter related to a 
long dwell time of a telescope on an object
– Programmatic – “The Bad”
• Relate to a mission missing a launch window or 
exceeding a budgetary cost cap which can lead to 
mission cancellation
– Radiation/Reliability – “The Ugly”
• Relate to mission meeting its lifetime and 
performance goals without premature failures or 
unexpected anomalies
• Each mission must determine its priorities 
among the three risk types Graphic from Free Vector Art.
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Background: Traditional Risk Matrix
Risk Tolerance Boundary
Placed on the profile to reflect
Corporate “Risk Appetite”
Caution Zone
Risks in the “yellow” area
need constant vigilance
and regular audit
By adjusting the level of
currency hedging, resources
can be released to help fund
improvements to protection of
the production facility.
Likelihood Scale: A: Very High B: High C: Occasional D: Low E: Very Low F: Almost Impossible
Impact Scale: I: Catastrophic II: Critical III: Significant IV: Marginal
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Space Missions:
EEE Parts and Risk
• The determination of acceptability for device 
usage is a complex trade space.
– Every engineer will “solve” a problem differently:
• Ex., software versus hardware solutions.
• The following chart proposes an alternate 
mission risk matrix approach for EEE parts 
based on:
– Environment exposure,
– Mission lifetime, and,
– Criticality of implemented function.
• Notes:
– “COTS” implies any parts grade that is not space 
qualified and radiation hardened.
– Level 1 and level 2 refer to traditional space qualified 
EEE parts.
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Notional EEE Parts Selection Factors
High Level 1 or 2 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad hard 
suggested. 
Full upscreening for 
COTS. 
Fault tolerant designs 
for COTS.
Level 1 or 2, rad 
hard 
recommended. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Medium COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested 
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended. 
Fault-tolerance 
recommended
Level 1 or 2, rad
hard suggested. 
Full upscreening 
for COTS. 
Fault tolerant 
designs for COTS.
Low COTS upscreening/
testing optional. 
Do no harm (to 
others)
COTS upscreening/
testing recommended.
Fault-tolerance 
suggested. 
Do no harm (to others)
Rad hard 
suggested. 
COTS upscreening/
testing 
recommended. 
Fault tolerance 
recommended
Low Medium High
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A Few Details on the “Matrix”
• When to test:
– “Optional”
• Implies that you might get away without this, but there’s residual risk.
– “Suggested”
• Implies that it is good idea to do this, and likely some risk if you don’t. 
– “Recommended”
• Implies that this really should be done or you’ll definitely have some 
risk.
– Where just the item is listed (like “full upscreening for COTS”) 
• This should be done to meet the criticality and environment/lifetime 
concerns.
• All fault tolerance/resilience must be validated.
• The higher the level of risk (i.e., more risk) that a mission deems 
acceptable,
– The greater the consideration for performing “alternate” assembly level 
testing versus traditional part level (reduced confidence approaches).
34
Good mission planning identifies where on the matrix a EEE part lies.
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Breaking Tradition:
Alternate Approaches to EEE Parts 
Assurance
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Assembly Testing:
Can it Replace Testing at the Parts Level?
We can test devices,
but how do we test 
systems?
Or better yet, systems of 
systems on a chip (SOC)?
36
NASA GSFC Picture of FPGA tester.
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Not All Assemblies are Equal
• Consider two distinct categories of assemblies:
– Off the shelf (you get what you get) such as COTS, and,
– Custom (possibility of having specific “design for test”)
• Still won’t be as complete as single part level testing, but it 
does reduce some challenges.
• For COTS assemblies, some specific concerns 
include: 
– Bill-of-materials may not include lot date codes or device 
manufacturer information.
– Individual part application may not be known or datasheet 
unavailable.
– The possible variances for “copies” of the “same” assembly:
• Form, fit, and function EEE parts may mean various 
manufacturers, or, 
• Other variation as discussed earlier (lot-to-lot, fab-to-fab).
37
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Selected Challenges for
Testing Assemblies
• Limited statistics versus part level approaches due to sample size.
• Inspection constraints.
• Reliability acceleration factors
– Temperature testing limited to “weakest” part.
– Voltage testing may be limited by on-board/on-chip power regulation.
• Limited test points and I/O = inadequate visibility of 
errors/failures/faults.
• Inadequate fault coverage testing.
• System operation.
– Ex., Using nominal flight software versus a high stress test approach.
• Error propagation
– An error occurs, but does not propagate outward until some time later 
due to system operations such as those of an interrupt register.
• Fault masking during radiation exposure
– Too high a particle rate or too many devices being exposed 
simultaneously.
38
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Using Fault Tolerance to Improve 
“Reliability/Availability” 
• Operational
– Ex., no operation in the South Atlantic Anomaly (proton hazard)
• System
– Ex., redundant boxes/busses or swarms of nanosats
• Circuit/software
– Ex., error detection and correction (EDAC) scrubbing of memory devices by 
an external device or processor
• Device (part)
– Ex., triple-modular redundancy (TMR) of internal logic within the device
• Transistor
– Ex., use of annular transistors for Total Ionizing Dose (TID) improvement
• Material
– Ex., addition of an epi substrate to reduce Single Event Effect (SEE) charge 
collection (or other substrate engineering)
Good engineers can invent infinite solutions,
but the solution used must be adequately validated.
It’s easy to show a working block diagram,
it’s hard to provide sufficient validation details.
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Possible Exceptions: 
Is Radiation Testing Always Required for COTS?
• Operational
– Ex., The device is only powered on once per orbit and the 
sensitive time window for a single event effect is minimal
• Acceptable data loss
– Ex., System level error rate (availability) may be set such 
that data is gathered 95% of the time.
• Given physical device volume and assuming every ion 
causes an upset, this worst-case rate may be acceptable.
• Negligible effect
– Ex., A 2 week mission may have a very low Total Ionizing 
Dose (TID) requirement.
A flash memory may be acceptable 
without testing if a low TID 
requirement exists or not powered on 
for the large majority of time.
Memory picture courtesy
NASA/GSFC, Code 561
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Is knowledge of EEE Parts Failure Modes
Required To Build a Fault Tolerant System?
• The system may work, but is there adequate 
confidence in the system to meet reliability and 
availability after launch?
• In no particular order:
– What are the “unknown unknowns”?
• Can we account for them?
– How do you adequately validate a fault tolerant system 
for space? 
• This is a critical point.
– How do you calculate risk with unscreened/untested 
EEE parts?
– Do you have a common mode failure potential in your 
design? 
• I.e., a design with identical redundant strings rather than 
having independent redundant strings.
41
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Summary: Assembly Testing and Fault Tolerance
• While clearly ANY testing is better 
than none, assembly testing has 
limitations compared to the individual 
EEE part level.
– This is a risk-trade that’s still to be 
understood.
– No definitive study exists comparing this 
approach versus traditional parts 
qualification and screening.
• Fault tolerance needs to be validated.
– Understanding the fault and failure 
signatures is required to design 
appropriate tolerance.
– The more complex the system, the harder 
the validation is.
• NOTE: NEPP is in final development of a proton test guideline for 
assemblies
42
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NEPP View of SmallSat Assurance
43
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Model Based Mission Assurance (MBMA)
44
• Motivation
– Commercial parts (COTS)
– Document-centric work flow 
to model-based system 
engineering
– System mitigation (for COTS)
– Single source of system 
design parameters
https://modelbasedassurance.org/ 
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Overview of Modeling Languages Used -
Model Based Systems Engineering (MBSE)
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Presented at NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Technical Interchange Meeting (TIM), Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, August 29-30, 2017.
Rebekah Austin, Vanderbilt University, used by permission.
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Summary
• In this talk, we have presented:
– An overview of considerations for alternate EEE parts 
approaches:
• Technical, programmatic, and risk-oriented
– Every mission views the relative priorities differently.
• As seen below, every decision type may have a 
process.
– It’s all in developing an appropriate one for your 
application and avoiding “buyer’s remorse”!
Five stages of Consumer Behavior
P. Kotler and G. Armstrong, "Consider Purchase Decision Process Model Reference," Principles of Marketing, 2001.
